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Abstract: In current history, as in the past, many international conflicts could be 
explained in terms of geopolitical factors. While geopolitical conflicts are raging 
in several parts of the world, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been most 
significant since the emergence of the modern state of Israel in 1948, resulting 
from the November 29, 1947 United Nations Resolution 181 adopted for two 
states creation in Palestine: one Arab, one Jewish. While the Jewish state came 
into being, the Arab one has remained a confounding issue. Why has the 
Palestinian state not been actualized? The paper argues that in last sixty-five 
years, efforts made to actualize the creation of a Palestinian state have suffered 
unnecessary paralysis due largely to socio-psychological perceptions and 
diplomatic conundrum between the two sides. The November 29, 2012 UN 
General Assembly resolution upgrading the Palestinian Authority from UN 
―observer‖ to ―non-state member observer‖ status was a significant diplomatic 
achievement for the Palestinians, but laced with political landmines. But a 
Palestinian state can be actualized if certain impediments are removed, with 
honesty of purpose on both sides and the third party mediators. 
 
 
 
Introduction  
Geopolitics can be viewed as the 
interplay between geography and 
politics, and how it helps to explain 
conflict in international politics and, in a 
broader sense, International Relations. 
Perceptions and the effect of geography 
on human development are the two 
basic assumptions underlying 
geopolitics. A nation‘s location on the 
face of the earth is a profound factor that 
affects its vital national interests, 
particularly its survival. This is the case 
of Israelis and Palestinians, and many 
other states in the world. Who owns the 
land or can claim autochthony?  
Because of the anarchic nature of world 
politics, it remains a difficult, if not 
impossible; task to resolve many 
international conflicts. However, the 
United Nations (UN) exists, playing the 
role, to a large extent, of a ―world 
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government‖, or a mediator in 
international disputes. Thus, the 1947 
UN General Assembly Resolution 181 
was adopted as an instrument for two-
state creation in Palestine: one Arab, 
one Jewish. This Resolution 181 led to 
the declaration and establishment of a 
state of Israel in May 1948; but the 
provision of the Resolution was rejected 
by the Arabs, which aborted the 
establishment of a state of Palestine 
during the same period. But the 2012 
UN General Assembly resolution 
upgraded the Palestinian Authority from 
observer to non-state observer status, 
which was   significant diplomatic 
achievement for the Palestinians in the 
last six-five years of struggle. To what 
extent has this resolved or confounded 
the problem? How can the socio-
psychological perceptions and 
diplomatic conundrum between the two 
parties be resolved, and in turn bring a 
relative peace to the age long conflict? 
Or, at a minimum move the peace 
process forward toward actualizing a 
Palestinian state? 
 
The paper is structured into five parts; 
with part one constituting this 
introduction. Part two appraises the 
historical and conceptual background; 
part three analyses both the 1947 and 
2012 UN resolutions; part four 
examines resolving the conflict beyond 
the two-state solution basis, and the 
conclusion. 
 
Historical and Conceptual 
Background 
Mesopotamia was, once the heartland of 
what is now known as the Middle East, 
where patriarch Abraham migrated to a 
territory previously populated by the 
Canaanites, Hittites, Jebusites, 
Philistines, among others. Ancient 
empires such as the Assyrian, 
Babylonian, Phoenitcian and Persian 
shaped the early Middle East and began 
its historicity (Lieberman, 2007). 
Foreign invaders, notably the Greeks, 
Mongols, and Romans, particularly the 
Romans played a role in the current 
crisis in the Middle East, especially the 
Israel-Palestine conflict. Between 68AD 
and 73AD, Jewish resistance against 
Roman rule resulted in ruthless crushing 
of the Jews and destruction of 
Jerusalem. Another revolt was again 
ruthlessly crushed in 131-135 AD. 
Emperor Hadrian (117-135) 
reconstructed Jerusalem as a Roman city 
and renamed it Aelia Capitolia and a 
temple of Jupiter was built on the 
original Temple site built by Solomon. 
More significantly, ―the land of Israel 
was renamed Palestine in honor of the 
Philistines who had occupied only five 
cities on the Mediterranean seaboard, 
including Gaza (Irene Princewill, 2006). 
More than honoring the Philistines, the 
Romans wanted to shame and humiliate 
the Jews and futuristically to create the 
current intractable problem for Israel. 
 
On the same territory, indigenous Arabs 
had ruled for centuries before finally 
displaced by normadic Turks who 
formed the Ottoman Empire. In turn, the 
Ottoman empire collapsed during the 
First World War, then ―the victorious 
allies carved out a complement of 
nations at the end of World War 1‖ 
(Lieberman, 2007). 
And Crawford Young writes: 
The partition of the Ottoman 
domains in the Levant between 
Great Britain and France and the 
imperial calculus employed in 
territorial definitions and structures 
of domination left in its wake a 
series of cancerous conflicts. The 
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duplicity of incompatible World War 
I promises to Arabs and Zionists 
bore the seeds of inextricable 
conflict over whether the Palestine 
mandate awarded to Great Britain 
by the League of Nations would 
develop as a Jewish homeland 
(state) or an Arab state (a 
Palestinian state (emphasis mine) 
(Young, 2013). 
 
Earlier Partition Proposals  
In the 1917 Balfour Declaration, Lord 
Balfour – the British foreign secretary – 
affirmed that the British government 
viewed ―with favor the establishment in 
Palestine of a National Home for the 
Jewish people (with the understanding 
that) nothing should be done to 
prejudice the civil and religious rights of 
the existing non-Jewish communities in 
Palestine ….‖ (Mansfield, 1992; 
Wikipedia, 2013). 
It should be noted that ―neither partition 
nor statehood‖ was contained in the 
document as a means to actualize ―the 
National Home‖. However, Lord 
Curson, who succeeded Balfour as 
foreign secretary, noted in a 
memorandum a concern about the fate 
of the Arab inhabitants of Palestine who 
had ―occupied the country for the best 
part of 1,500 years‖, and would ―not be 
content either to be expropriated for 
Jewish immigrants, or to act merely as 
hewers of wood and drawers of water to 
the later‖ (Mansfield, 1992: 172-175). 
 
In addition, there were also the 1937 
Peel Commission, the 1938 Woodhead 
Commission, and the 1939 MacDonald 
Commission. In May 1939, the 
MacDonald White Paper declared that it 
was ―not part of (the British 
government‘s) policy that Palestine 
should become a Jewish State‖ and 
therefore sought to end the immigration 
of Jews to Palestine. The prohibitionof 
Jewish immigration to Palestine led to 
the formation of Lehi a small Jewish 
terrorist organization, which opposed 
the British and fought on the side of the 
axis through the Second World War 
(Wikipedia, 2013). 
 
Lord Curson`s mention of the Arab 
inhabitants who had ―occupied the 
country for the  best part of 1500 years‖ 
,would need further clarification. It 
should be noted that the Jews had 
suffered series of dispersion, starting 
with famine-induced migration to Egypt 
(lasting over 400 years of captivity) 
which ended with the great exodus 
under Moses. Thereafter they 
experienced the Assyrian, Babylonnia, 
Persian, captivities. The dispersion that 
started in 70 AD, with the destruction of 
Jerusalem by the Romans, lasted until 
early 18th century. By the second and 
third centuries ‗anti-Semitism had begun 
to spread across Europe‘ and within the 
Church. Chryststom (345-407 AD), 
nicknamed ―golden mouth‖, demonized 
the Jews thus: 
The Jews worship the devil, their 
religion is sickness, they are the 
odious assassin of Christ and for 
killing God, and there is no 
expiation possible in indulgence or 
pardon. Christian may never cease 
vengeance and the Jews must live in 
servitude forever .God always hated 
the Jews .It is incumbent upon all 
Christians to hate the Jews (Quoted 
in Dagobert, 1966:42; Princewill, 
2007:6-7). 
So, from the 400s, most probably from 
417, by Curson calculation, to 1917, the 
Arabs occupied the country while the 
Jews were dispersed and suffering 
untold persecution all over Europe and 
other parts of the world. Reversely 
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today the Jews have been described as 
the ‗occupiers‘ of Arab lands. 
 
Geopolitics  
Geopolitics is the interface between 
geography and politics, a study of ―how, 
and in what ways, geography and 
international politics interact‖. A 
geopolitics framework of analysis 
examines ―the many ways geography 
affects politics and foreign policy, from 
its impact on national identity and 
nationalism to the manner in which it 
supports and detracts from a country`s 
economic and social development‖ 
(Duncan et al, 2003 : 297-298) . Several 
roles played by geography in 
international relations, like engendering 
cooperation and conflict between states; 
affecting global climate change, 
environment, and natural disasters; 
conditioning trade and investment 
flows; and affecting the spread of 
information technology, all these and 
much more constitute ―the heart and 
soul‖ of geopolitics(Ibid). 
 
Applying the concept of geopolitics to 
the analysis of international politics 
throws up a number of relevant 
questions. Such questions would 
include: why does it matter where a 
state is located on the globe or who are 
its neighbors? Specifically, for this 
paper: why does it bother Palestinians 
(Arabs) where Israel is located, (or 
exists), and vice-versa? How big is the 
role strategic features like water-ways, 
peninsula, mountains, canals, and so on, 
play in relations among nations? How 
significant is it that the straits of 
Hormuz might be blockaded (say by 
Iran) to prevent oil tankers from 
entering or departing the Persian Gulf 
(to the Western world)? Then, what 
constitute geopolitical conflict in 
international relations? 
 
Geopolitics is anchored on two basic 
assumptions: the impact of geography 
on human development, and perception. 
Jared Diamond, in his book, Guns, 
Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human 
Societies underscores the fact that ―the 
impact of geography on human 
development is profound‖. Beyond 
―where humans live and what territorial 
state they occupy‖ in great measure 
conditioning their level of development, 
Diamond equally notes that humans 
struggle with each other over territory 
―like most animal species‖. This they 
have been doing since the beginning of 
time. In fact, Diamond theorized that 
human behavior is close to animal 
behavior as regards territoriality in that 
we humans share 98% of our genetic 
program with the primates. Much of that 
competition for territory, he argues, 
‗takes the form of wars between 
adjacent groups, marked by hostility and 
mass killing‘ (Diamond, 1992; Duncan 
et al, 2003: 297) 
A second assumption is the world of 
perceptions. Scholars of global politics 
and foreign policy would argue that 
human perceptions of the world is 
composed a sort of prism through which 
we interpret realities around us (Rourke, 
1999) and their accuracy or otherwise is 
irrelevant. In this regard, ―territorially 
based perceptions‖ clues could befound 
as to how distinct population groups 
define their state identity and vital 
interests (territorial security, economic 
vitality, political goals) and the reasons 
they use various kinds of diplomacy in 
achieving those interests (Duncan et al). 
It is in this way that these factors shape 
the conflict and/or cooperation between 
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states, that is, the geopolitics in foreign 
policy and diplomatic relation. 
 
Conflict 
Conflict, derived from the Latin word 
―confligere‖, means shock, clash, 
collision (Encyclopedia of Violence, 
Peace and Conflict, 2008:391). Conflict 
can be understood from two 
perspectives: first as a difference, and 
second as a battle. As a difference it can 
mean discord, disagreement, dissention, 
confrontation and dispute. It can also 
mean antagonism, friction, opposition, 
hostility, strife and unrest or crisis. 
Conflict as a battle could mean war, 
warfare, combat, skirmish, fight, 
quarrel, feud, brawl, clash, fracas, and 
the likes (Chambers Large Print 
Thesaurus, 2006). 
 
While there is a distinction between 
conflict and war, the second category of 
meaning given above may be confusing. 
It is so because conflict is ordinarily 
understood to mean a non-violent act. 
However, when a peaceful solution is 
not found and the situation degenerates, 
the opposing sides take up arms and it 
becomes organized ―armed conflict‖, 
which simply means war. So the warfare 
situation is also referred to as conflict. 
The difference tenable in the 
circumstance is that while conflict 
describes a prolonged disagreement of 
feud, lasting generations, war is armed 
conflict lasting a given period and 
occurring intermittently. 
 
Conflict, from international relations 
perspective, is any given instance of the 
endemic antagonism in political life 
between various interests and/or 
principles. This may be ameliorated by 
respect for international law, through 
diplomacy (negotiation) or it may end in 
warm or cold war (The Greenwood 
Encyclopedia of International Relations, 
2002: 338). 
 
United Nations Resolutions on Two-
State Creation (1947-2012): The 
Palestinian Renaissance 
History is a good teacher for those who 
would learn from it, they will not perish 
but actualize their dream. This actively 
explains the current status of the 
Palestinians in their struggle towards 
statehood, if they would further learn 
from the hard facts of the historicity of 
their struggle. 
 
The Middle East geo-political caldron 
has been burning almost continually 
since the passage of the 1947 UN 
General Assembly Resolution 181 
which created Two States in Palestine: 
one Arab, one Jewish. The all-time big 
question is: Why and how did the state 
of Israel come into existence and the 
Palestinian state remains elusive? 
 
November 29, 1947: UN Resolution 
181 
Lake Success, New York, U.S.A, was 
the meeting place of the United Nations 
General Assembly, November 29, 1947. 
Here, on this day, the UN partition plan 
was put into votes, in the 57-member 
global assembly.  In Resolution 181, 33 
states voted in favor, 13 against, 10 
abstentions and one absent 
(www.mideast.com). In addition to two 
states: an Arab state, a Jewish state, 
Resolution 181also declared Jerusalem 
was declared as Corpus Separatum – a 
separate body to exist under 
(international) UN Administration. The 
area in question includes all of 
Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Beit Sahour 
which encompasses the Christian holy   
sites (The UN Partition Plan for 
Palestine, November 29, 1947, Mideast 
Web). 
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The Jews accepted the resolution while 
the Palestinians rejected it. The Arabs 
and Palestinians felt that it was ―a total 
injustice to ignore the rights of the 
majority of the population of Palestine‖. 
Hence the Arab League and Palestinian 
institutions, following their rejection of 
the plan, ―formed volunteer armies that 
infiltrated into Palestine‖ as from 
December 1947.The volunteer armies 
were composed of the Arab Liberation 
Army and the Palestinian Arab Army of 
the Holy War(Jihad), under the 
command of Abd al- Qadir al- Husayni 
and Hassan Salama 
(wikipedia.encyclopedia.mht).  
In actual fact, violence swept Palestine 
the following day (that is, November 30, 
1947) of the adoption of Resolution 181. 
To counter the Arab and Palestinian 
armies attacks, the Jews had their 
underground militias composed of the 
Haganah,  Irgun and Lehi, re-inforced 
by several Jewish veterans of World 
War II  and other foreign volunteers, all 
known as Yishuv forces (Ibid). 
 
Amidst this violent conflict, the state of 
Israel was declared on May 14 1948; 
thus triggered the main phase of the 
1948 Arab-Israeli War. This initial 
fighting claimed about 15,000 
casualties, and resulted in a cease fire 
and armistice agreements of 1949(Ibid). 
 
It was this chaotic and armed conflict 
situation, and in a state of ―diplomatic   
morass‖, that the Jews took a unilateral 
decision on their survival. Thus, on May 
14, 1948, they informed the 
international community of the 
existence of the state of Israel (Gregory 
Mahler and Alden Mahler, 2010:11). 
Within hours of the declaration of the 
birth of a (new) state of Israel, a 
coalition of Arab states forces--Syria, 
Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon and Saudi 
Arabia -- began an invasion to ―drive 
Israel into the sea‖. Instead, rather than 
being scrapped into the sea, Israel 
fought hard believing its survival 
depended on it, conquering more 
territory (Ibid).  
 
By April 1949, both sides reached a 
cease fire and an armistice. The 
armistice meant that each side would 
maintain the Status quo positions and as 
such Israel was ―awarded significantly 
more territory than it had been given 
under the United Nations earlier 
partition plan‖. Moreover, the armistice 
―did not allow for an independent 
Palestine State‖. Rather, the West Bank 
came under the control of Jordan; Israel 
and Jordan shared Jerusalem; and Egypt 
took control of the Gaza Strip, lying 
between Israel and Egypt (Mahler and 
Mahler). 
 
After rejecting the 1947 UN plan, the 
first move to establish what might be 
described as a Palestinian government 
was made by ―the All- Palestine 
Government‖ as declared by the Arab 
League on September 22, 1948; but this 
was abandoned by Egypt in 1959. 
However, Yasser Arafat established a 
new organization- the Palestine 
Liberation Organization in 1964 
(Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, 
January 10, 2013). 
 
In 1967, a pall of catastrophe gathered 
over Israel. Israel turned to the United 
States for help but declined. This was 
partly because U.S. President Lyndon 
Johnson was ‗very occupied‘ during the 
period ‗with America‘s challenges in 
Vietnam‘ and therefore ―not interested‖ 
in US forces getting involved in the 
Middle East (Mahler and Mahler). 
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Faced with escalating hostilities from 
both Egypt and Syria, and without 
―diplomatic recourse‖, to any great 
power, Israel launched a pre-emptive 
attack on Egypt and Syria in June of 
1967, and Jordan joined on the side of 
Egypt and Syria. Again, Israel fought 
for its very existence, and fought very 
hard. In six days, Israel found itself 
gaining control of the West Bank, the 
Gaza Strip, the Sinai and the Golan 
Heights. The 1967 Six-Day War was a 
major setback to the ability of the PLO 
to establish any control on the ground as 
Jordan, Egypt and Syria lost territories 
to Israel. 
 
United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 242, November 22, 1967 
November 22, 1967, saw the passage 
Resolution 242 predicated on the 
‗exchange of land for peace‘ in 
Palestine. The resolution called for the 
―withdrawal of Israeli armed forces 
from territories occupied in the recent 
conflict‖, that is, the Six- Day War, and 
―respect for and acknowledgement of 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
political independence of every state in 
the area and their right to live in peace 
within secure and recognized boundaries 
free from threats or acts of force.‖(BBC 
News, 27 august 2010). Resolution 242 
has remained a reference point of 
several diplomatic peace initiatives, and 
revolution 338 is often linked to it, 
which called for and brought the 1973 
Yom Kippur (October War) to an end 
and recommended the implementation 
of 242 by all parties. In fact, 242 
featured prominently in the 1993 Oslo 
agreement (Ibid). 
 
Oslo Agreement, September 9, 1993 
The 1993 Oslo Agreement was a 
product of Second-Track  diplomacy, a 
diplomacy conducted off the public 
glare but later presented  to   it. It was 
so, in order to avoid extraneous 
influence that could derails negotiation 
process. 
 
Diplomatic correspondence between the 
PLO chairman, Yasser Arafat, and the 
Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, 
set the tone of the Oslo agreement, as 
the negotiation took place in ―secret‖ 
under the auspices of Norwegian 
diplomats; and the agreement signed on 
the white house lawn on September 
13,1993,‖witnessed‖ by the united states 
of America and Russian federation 
(Ibid). 
 
Chairman Arafat‘s letter in paragraphs 
two and six, read inter alia: 
The PLO recognizes the right of the 
state of Israel to exist in peace and 
security. In view of the promise of a 
new era and the signing of the 
declaration of principles and based 
on Palestine on acceptance of the 
Security Council Resolutions 242 
and 338, the PLO affirms that those 
articles of the Palestinian Covenant 
which deny Israel’s right to exist, 
and the provisions of the Covenant 
which are inconsistent with 
commitments of this letter are now 
imperative and no longer valid… 
(September 9, 1993). 
 
On the same day, Prime Minister 
Rabin‘s one paragraph letter read: 
In response to your letter of 
September 9, 1993, I wish to confirm 
to you that, in light of the PLO 
commitments included in your letter, 
the Government of Israel has 
decided to recognize the PLO as the 
representative of the Palestinian 
people and commence negotiations 
with the PLO within the Middle East 
peace process (September 9, 1993). 
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Article XIV of the Declaration of 
Principles stipulated Israel‘s withdrawal 
from the Gaza strip and Jericho area…. 
 
Again, on the same day, Chairman 
Arafat‘s letter to the Norwegian foreign 
minister, the lead negotiator and 
mediator, read; 
I would like to confirm to you that, 
upon the signing of the Declaration 
of Principles, the PLO encourages 
and calls upon the Palestinian 
people in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip to take part in the steps leading 
to the normalization of life, rejecting 
violence and terrorism, contributing 
to peace and stability and 
participating actively in shaping 
reconstruction economic 
development and co-operation. 
(September 9, 1993). 
Unfortunately, there are rejectionist 
groups among both the Israelis and 
Palestinians. Hamas and other 
Palestinian rejectionist groups did not 
accept Oslo treaty and launched suicide 
bomb attacks on Israelis. In Israel the 
rejectionist groups opposed ―land for 
peace‖ deal especially among the 
―settler-led groups‖. Sadly, Prime 
Minister Rabin was shot and killed, 
November 4,1995, by an Israeli student 
who was against the Oslo treaties and 
―their subsequent 
developments‖(Mahler and Mahler). 
Therefore, for the most part, Oslo 
Accords were only partially 
implemented. 
After 1995, several diplomatic rounds 
had been held between the Israelis and 
Palestinians, and some form of 
agreements reached either partially or 
never implemented according to the 
spirit and letter of those agreements. 
Such agreements include the following: 
• Oslo II,September 1995. This was 
an interim agreement in pursuant 
of 1993 Accord. 
•   Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, 
September 4, 1999. This 
memorandum was on 
Implementation Timeline of 
Outstanding Commitments of 
Agreements signed and the 
Resumption of Permanent Status 
Negotiations. Never  fully  
implemented. 
• The Wye River Memorandum. A 
consummation of the Protocol 
Concerning Safe Passage signed in 
October 1999, was ―to contribute 
to the normalization of life of the 
Palestinians ―by making it easier 
for them to travel to and from the 
West Bank to Gaza Strip, through 
Israel. Again,it was never 
implemented. 
• Taba Summit, 2001. The Taba 
Summit in Taba, Egypt, was held 
in January, 2001, removed 
―temporarily Israeli controlled‖ 
areas, and the Palestinian side 
accepted this proposal as basis for 
further diplomatic discourse. In a 
joint statement, both sides agreed 
that: ‗it proved impossible to reach 
to reach understandings on all 
issues‘. However, Ehud Barak, 
Israeli Prime Minister, faced with 
stiff election in 2001, said: 
‗nothing is agreed upon until 
everything is agreed upon‘. 
• Arab Peace Plan, 2002. The main 
provisions of the peace plan were 
that Israel would trade all lands 
conquered and occupied at the end 
of the 1967 Six-Day War; that a 
Palestine state would be set up in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip; and 
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that there would be a ―just 
solution‖ to the refugee case. And 
all this would be followed by Arab 
states recognizing the state of Israel 
(Rubin, 2013). 
• The Quartet Roadmap, 2003. The  
‗Quartet  Roadmap ‘ is a  plan 
composed of the European Union, 
Russia, the United States, and the 
United Nations. It remains a 
roadmap never followed but ―a 
reference point for negotiations.‖ 
• Geneva Accord, 2003. The 
roadmap concept seemed to have 
been reversed by the Geneva 
Accord, in which ―the growth of 
security and confidence‖ come 
before a political agreement. 
Essentially, it provided for certain 
land swaps on the Israeli side, with 
Palestinians having the right to ―to 
have their capital in east Jerusalem, 
though with Israeli sovereignty 
over the Western Wall in the Old 
city.‖ 
.    Annapolis, 2007. The Annapolis 
Conference was aimed at a 
relaunch of the peace process.        
US President George Bush Jr; hosted 
Ehud Olmert, Israeli Prime Minister and 
Mahmoud Abbas, Palestinian Authority 
president, at the U. S. Navy Academy at 
Annapolis, Maryland. Other officials 
that took part in the peace talks included 
those from the Quartet  and over a dozen 
Arab states, including Saudi Arabia and 
Syria, even though without official 
recognition of isreal.It was hoped that 
both Israeli and Palestinian leaders 
would continue to engage in 
negotiations with ―the goal of a full 
peace deal by the end of 2008‖. 
However, the hope was shattered by the 
Palestinian (Hamas group) incessant 
rocket attacks on Israel, and the reprisal 
Israeli military offensive in Gaza in 
November 2008. 
 
Here lies the diplomatic conundrum in 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Hopes 
have been raised and dash due to 
societal attitudes in both Israel and 
Palestine, thereby frustrating efforts of 
‗third party‘ negotiators and mediators. 
Virtually every diplomatic effort since 
1947 to the present had been punctured 
and aborted. Palestinian society remains 
divided politically and geographically 
between the Hamas – controlled Gaza 
Strip and Fatah--controlled West Bank. 
Similarly, Israeli society is torn between 
peace activists and those opposed any 
deal with the Palestinians on account of 
security concerns. On both sides of the 
divide there exist the moderates and 
extremists. 
 
As each peace talk was approached with 
great measure of apprehension and 
trepidation, ―the more moderate‖ 
Palestinian Authority of the Fatah group 
based in the West Bank invested more 
in diplomatic strategy through the 
United Nations platform. Still, some 
analysts do not believe the Palestine 
Authority strategy could work out any 
meaningful solution to the conflict. But 
since 2011 the PA had applied to the 
UN for Palestinian statehood bid. 
 
Ali Abunimah, writing in Foreign 
Affairs, argues that; 
The Palestine authority bid to the 
United Nations for the Palestinian 
statehood is at least in theory, 
supposed to circumvent the failed 
peace process. But in two crucial 
aspects, the ill-conceived gambit 
actually makes things worse, 
amplifying the flaws of the process it 
seeks to replace. First, it excludes 
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the Palestinian people from 
decision-making process. And 
second, it entirely disconnects the 
discourse about statehood from 
reality (Foreign Affairs, September 
19, 2011). 
For over 65 years, the peace process has 
dragged on, rendering any hope to 
achieve Palestine statehood elusive. 
Consequently as peace talks continued 
to end in deadlocks, alternative avenues 
were being explored to reach a desired 
goal, even trying the recapture of once 
lost opportunity. It is an obvious 
realization that oppositions do exist both 
internal and external to the Palestinian 
society. Externally, the UN Palestinian 
bid set Israel and the US fiercely 
opposed to it, and most Arab 
governments. Internally, certain 
Palestinian officials and the people 
themselves provided little or no support 
at all for the effort (Abunimah). 
 
November 29, 2012:  UN Resolution 
67/19 
Since September 2010, Israel and 
Palestine direct peace negotiations have 
stalled following Israel‘s refusal to 
extend its ‗freeze on settlement activity‘ 
in the Palestine territory. Thus, 
Palestinian officials have argued that the 
process was already ―so moribund that it 
was simple common sense for them to 
pursue an alternative path‖(Kevin 
Connolly, BBC, Middle East 
correspondence, November 30, 
2012).That ‗alternative path‘ was their 
application since 2011 to the UN for full 
member status for the state of Palestine, 
even though some countries criticized 
this move for purportedly avoiding 
bilateral negotiations 
(http://en.wikipidia.org). 
 
However a reprieve came the way of the 
Palestinians in 2012. In 1997 the UN 
had set aside an annual International 
Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian 
People. The day marked the date in 
1947 (November 29) when the 
Assembly adopted Resolution 181. As 
the November date approached, the 
diplomatic tempo was reaching its 
heightened pitch in New York City, 
West Bank and Israel.  
 
Then the Day came: Thursday, 
November 20, 2012. The United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 
67/19, upgrading Palestine non-member 
observer state status, came up for vote. 
Resolution 67/19 was approved by a 
vote of 138-9, with 41 abstentions, in 
the 193 – member Assembly. The 
resolution was adopted by the sixty- 
seventh session of the UN, and marked 
the 65th anniversary of the adoption of 
Resolution 181(ii) of 1947 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ United_ 
Nations_General_ Assembly_ resolution 
_67/19). 
 
Responses were mixed among diplomats 
and between Israelis and Palestinians. 
But in the words of the UN Secretary- 
General, Ban Ki-Moon, ―Today‘s vote 
underscores the urgency of a resumption 
of meaningful negotiations. We must 
give new impetus to our collective 
efforts that an independent, sovereign, 
democratic, contiguous and viable state 
of Palestine lives side by side with a 
secured state of Israel. I urge the parties 
to renew their commitment to a 
negotiated peace‖(http://www.un.org/ 
apps/news/ story.asp?NewsID=43640). 
 
The choice of date was not an accident 
but rather predetermined and attempts to 
bring some sense of order and direction 
into decades of diplomatic conundrum. 
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As Mossi Raz, a former Israeli 
lawmaker and veteran activist, 
succinctly puts it ―it‘s aimed at 
correcting a historical mistake‖ (Heller 
and Perry, 2012). But whose mistake 
was it? 
 
Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian 
President, admitted in an Israeli TV 
interview in 2011 that the Arab world 
erred in rejecting the 1947 UN 
partitioning plan. In his words, ‗It was 
our mistake. It was an Arab mistake as a 
whole‘ (Heller and Perry, http//twitter. 
com/perry dan) 
 
Benjamin Netanyahu, Israelis Prime 
Minister reaction was rather not candid. 
He said ―the decision at the UN today 
(Thursday, November 29, 2012) will 
change nothing on the ground. It will 
not advance the establishment of a 
Palestinian state; it will push it off…. ‖ 
(The Washington Post, Friday, 
November 30, 2012) 
 
Resolving the Two-State Solution: 
How workable? 
The idea of ‗the two states solution‘ to 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is rooted 
in the 1947 UNGA resolution 181 as 
contained in parts I and II of the 
partition plan. Several diplomatic efforts 
have been exacted, and so far failed, to 
broker a two- state solution, with an 
independent Palestinian state existing 
side by side an independent Jewish state 
within secured borders. 
 
However, there is a strong feeling 
among a majority of both Israelis and 
Palestinians with high preference for 
―the two-state solution over any other 
solution as means of resolving the 
conflict‖ 
(http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/9
33214.html). 
 
In September 2012, during the 67th 
session of the UN, Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu extended his hand 
in peace to the Palestine President 
Abbas towards ensuring the creation of 
―a solution of two-states for two 
peoples, where a demilitarized 
Palestinian state will recognize Israel as 
a Jewish state‖ (NY Times.com). 
After the adoption of resolution 67/19, 
President Abbas spoke to the Assembly, 
that ―the General Assembly is called 
upon …to issue a birth certificate of the 
reality of the state of Palestine,‖ and by 
the same speech condemned what he 
referred to as Israeli ‗racism and 
colonialism‘. Ethan Bronner and 
Christine Hauser write that Abbas‘ 
remarks seemed aimed in parts at both 
Israel and Hamas, and both responded to 
―the parts they found offensive‖ ( NY 
Times.com) 
 
Prime Minister Netanyahu responded 
thus: ―The world watched a defamatory 
and venomous speech that was full of 
mendacious propaganda against the 
Israel defence forces and the citizens of 
Israel. Someone who wants peace does 
not talk in such a manner.‖  
 
Hamas spokesman, Salah al-Bardaweel, 
in utter contradictory response, 
reaffirmed their former stand that: 
‗There are controversial issues in the 
point that Abbas raised, and Hamas has 
the right to preserve its position over 
them. We do not recognize Israel nor 
does the partition of Palestine and Israel 
have no right in Palestine. Getting our 
membership in the UN bodies is our 
natural right, but without giving up any 
inch of Palestine‘s soil (NY Times 
.com). 
 
Equally confounding is Mr. Abbas 
‗attitude as regards the issue of ‗two 
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states solution‘.  Ron Prosor, Israel‘s 
UN ambassador, expressed the concern 
that the Palestinian Authority has failed 
to recognize Israel for what it is. That 
afternoon of November 29, 2012, 
ambassador   Prosor says:‘In fact, 
President Abbas, I did not hear you use 
the phrase ‗two states for two peoples 
‗this afternoon. In fact, I have never 
heard you say the phrase ‗two states for 
two people because the Palestinian 
leadership has never recognized that 
Israel is the nation state of the Jewish 
people (NYtimes.com). 
 
Indeed, there is no credible and 
harmonious Palestine leadership. Mr. 
Abbas presides over a divided house 
between the Hamas in control of the 
Gaza Strip and Fatah in the West Bank. 
He is not welcome in Gaza since 2008 
when he was forced out.  He maintains 
only a weak control of Fatah in the West 
Bank, which clearly ―shows that there is 
no viable Palestinian leadership‖ living 
up to expectation of realizing a two-state 
solution to the conflict. Therefore, the 
UN Resolution 67/19 to upgrade the 
status of the Palestinians by the 138 
member states majority votes could only 
be taken as ―largely symbolic‖. But 
―symbolism‖ is said to be something 
that matters in the Middle East 
(Connolly). 
 
But for the actualization of the state of 
Palestine, symbolism must be translated 
to actual international person, a 
sovereign state with clearly defined 
boundaries and legitimate government. 
For this to happen, the question of the 
right of Israel to exist must be settled. In 
other words, Hamas and other Islamists 
and Arab governments such as 
Hezbollah and Iran must recognize the 
right of Israel to exist. Iran‘s position, 
for instance, under President Mahmoud 
Almadinejad that Israelis have no roots 
in the history of the Middle East and 
that the nation must be ―eliminated‖ or 
―wiped off the map‖ is unacceptable 
(http://www.theblaze.com/stories/ 
Almadinejad-Israel-has-no-historic….). 
 
‗Come, they say, and let us wipe out 
Israel as a nation-we will destroy the 
very memory of her existence. This was 
their unanimous decision at their 
summit conferences – they signed a 
treaty to ally themselves against Israel.‘ 
―Scrapping Israel into the 
Mediterranean‖ ―wiping Israel off the 
map‖, eliminating and annihilating the 
nation of Israel are some of the  
expressions that portray the Arab 
leadership attitude towards Israel, 
attributable to leaders like Nasser of 
Egypt, Ahmadinejad of Iran, and other 
groups like  Hamas and Hezbollah. This 
may render ―the Arab League Peace 
Initiative‖ covertly suspect (Rubin, 
2013).  
 
The Arab League Peace Initiative was 
first proposed and published in March 
2002, at the Beirut Summit, agreed upon 
again in 2007 in the Riyadh Summit, 
and once again renewed in 2013 in 
Washington (USA), as led by Qatar. It is 
a proposed solution, tagged ―final 
solution.‖  It offers ―full normalization 
of relations with Israel, in exchange for 
the withdrawal of its forces from all the 
occupied territories, including the Golan 
Heights, to recognize an independent 
Palestinian state with east Jerusalem as 
its capital‖  as well as a ‗just solution‘ 
for the Palestinian refugees‖ (http://en 
Wikipedia.org;  Rubin, 2013). 
As Rubin clearly observes, the supposed 
peace plan, though ―a good thing‖ but at 
best ―a bluff‖ or ‗a scam‘. For one thing, 
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key member states of the Arab league 
are enemies of Israel, except Jordan, 
Bahrain and possibly   Saudi Arabia. 
And for another, as Rubin argues, ―if 
you factor in the islamist- ruled places- 
Egypt, the Gaza strip, Lebanon, Tunisia, 
and soon Syria- into the equation, the 
picture looks different‖. Furthermore, if 
one includes public opinion and the 
efforts of revolutionary Islamist ready to 
condemn any such deal as treason, the 
picture is further compounded. Even, 
the Hamas in control of Gaza ―will 
refuse to abide by any such agreement‖ 
(Rubin, 2013) 
Equally true also is Tunisia‘s Muslim 
brotherhood-dominated leadership, 
which has already written in the 
county‘s new constitution that it can 
never make peace with Israel.  Iran's 
position is also very clear on this matter; 
except, of course, if the new Iranian 
President Hassan Rouhani would soften 
Iran‘s policy of annihilation of Israel, 
which is not likely in the immediate. 
 
Nonetheless, ―third party‖ diplomatic 
efforts may be good in conflict 
resolution, but in the case of the Israeli-
Palestinian‘s conflict, bilateral peace 
talk may be more effective. Both parties 
should continue   to explore such 
approach. Also, the divided Palestinians 
must unite and recognize the right of 
Israel to exist. After all, the Hamas 
claims to have ―natural right‖ to be a 
member of committee of nations. Why 
then should they seek the wiping off of 
another nation from existence? 
 
Mutual recognition of each other‘s right 
to exist and live in peace and security is 
a major step towards resolving other 
seemingly intractable issues such as the 
status of Jerusalem, and the return of 
displaced people. 
 
The perception, that since several 
rounds of failed diplomacy between 
Israeli and Palestinian leaders have 
reinforced the people‘s belief, ―that the 
gap between the two sides remains too 
wide and that the largest concessions 
Israel could offer would still fail to meet 
the minimum that the Palestinians could 
live with‖, could be altered. The conflict 
can be contained if mutual recognition is 
accepted. This is the core area the 
Palestinian people and the leadership 
must work on. As two Israeli authors 
write—Yosef  Kuperwasser and Shalom 
Lipner – the disagreement   and failed 
negotiations between Israel and the 
Palestinians is not so much over specific 
issues, such as settlements or Jerusalem, 
but fundamentally, ―the Palestinians‘ 
refusal to recognize Israel as a Jewish 
state‖ (Kuperwasser and Lipner,2011; 
Naom Shaizaf, 2013) . 
 
The Palestinian leadership demands ‗a 
freeze in Israeli settlement – building‘ in 
the West Bank as a precondition for 
bilateral peace talks. During President 
Barack Obama‘s visits to both 
Jerusalem and Ramallah, in March 
2013, he urged the Palestinians to drop 
such demands, but the Mahmoud 
Abbas‗s administration insisted that ―the 
precondition remained in place‖. 
However, that did not stop President 
Obama from stressing the need for 
Palestinians to ‗share same values of 
self-determination and justice‘ with the 
Israelis.In the same vein he told his 
young Israeli audience: ‗It is not fair 
that Palestinian children cannot grow up 
in a state of their own, living entire lives 
with the presence of foreign army that 
controls the movements of their parents 
every single day‖(bbc.co.uk; the 
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Guardian{Lagos }, March24,2013, 
p.19).  
 
Frankly, there is no meaningful talk 
about peace without justice. The only 
precondition for peace should be, and is, 
inclusive mutual recognition of each 
other‘s right to exist. It must be 
inclusive recognition because without 
other Islamist like Hamas and Hezbollah 
willingly recognizing Israel‘s right of 
existence, every effort by Abbas-led 
Fatah remains futile. Justice demands 
such inclusive mutual recognition of 
right of existence, which will in turn 
address other core issues that may be 
considered injustice. What drives 
Israelis settlement –building program 
has to do with their sense of uncertainty 
and security concerns.  
 
Conclusion 
Understanding the geopolitics and 
historicity of the Middle East presents 
some good picture to appreciate the 
Israeli- Palestinian conflict. Even 
though two historians may never agree 
on what happened in the past, and ‗the 
damn thing is they both think they‘re 
telling the truth‘ in the words of Harry 
Truman (Mideast Web), but the fact 
remains that the truth lies between the 
stories. The denial of right of existence 
to Israel premised on the historical 
denial and distortion of truth that the 
Jews had ―no historical roots in the 
Middle East‖ can be corrected by 
historical evidence.  
 
Correcting some historical mistake has 
brought a glimmer of hope to the 
Palestinian march towards statehood. 
UNR 67/19 of November 29, 2012 has 
reinvigorated UNR 181 of November 
29, 1947, 65 years after. Still, there are 
obstacles on the roadmap to actualize a 
Palestine state to exist side-by-side a 
state of Israel. Among such obstacles 
are both sides‘ preconditions, and lack 
of collective recognition by the 
Palestinians of the right of existence of a 
Jewish state of Israel on these rests other 
intractable issues for frank and 
principled negotiations. 
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